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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine if the process of filtering out financial information 
voluntary disclosed by firms was modified by the introduction of the IFRS. Voluntary 
information disclosed by French firms during the 2003-2008 period is compiled. This original 
dataset includes several years both before and after the introduction of the IFRS in the 
European Union in 2005. We use regression analysis to identify the determinants of the 
communications policies of listed firms followed in this study. We show that publication 
score, for some firms, indicates how much useful qualitative information is brought to the 
market. Particularly, we show that highly communicative firms reduce the information 
asymmetry as measured by the dispersion of analysts’ earning forecasts. The voluntary 
disclosure of information and earnings forecasts by analysts are endogenous and exhibit a 
complex two-way relationship. Voluntary communication policies did not change with the 
introduction of the IFRS. 
  
 
 
Keywords: publication score, voluntary disclosure, financial communication, information 
policy, IFRS introduction, analysts’ forecasts 
 
JEL: M40, M41 
 
                                                 
1
 This paper was presented at the 2010 French Finance Association Meeting at St Malo, at the2010  9th 
International Governance Conference at Metz, at the 2010 17th MFS Meeting at Barcelona, at the 2011 
Montpellier French AFC Meeting and at the EFMA 2011 conference at Porto. We thank internal seminar 
participants, J. Callen and L. Paugam for their helpful comments. 
2 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were introduced in 2005 for 
European listed firms. These standards were intended to improve the transparency and quality 
of the financial information broadcast by companies, to create common and better accounting 
principles and to improve the mandatory information standards. The goal of the IFRS is to 
increase the informativeness of the financial information delivered to investors and, more 
globally, to financial market participants. Voluntary financial disclosure refers to additional 
information disclosed beyond the mandatory information. We analyze voluntary disclosure as 
a tool of an existing communication policy. The strength and the scope of this policy are 
analyzed using an individual voluntary disclosure score. This paper presents the individual 
quantitative scores of voluntary disclosure for French firms over the 2002-2008 period, which 
includes the introduction of IFRS in 2005.  
 
We determine the quality of the disclosed information by looking at its effect on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. If the delivered information is useful, analysts will exploit it and 
converge more easily toward a consensus. The level of voluntary financial disclosure may be 
related to the level of mandatory financial and accounting disclosure. Exogenous and univocal 
changes in the latter, such as the introduction of new accounting standards, may be a key 
determinant of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the introduction of IFRS rules in Europe 
offers a framework for an empirical test. However, voluntary disclosure may also refer to 
firms’ long-term information choices. The determinants of these choices may be specific to 
the firm. In addition, there are consequences of the disclosure of information: (i) the improved 
quality of financial information available to the market and (ii) the reduction of information 
asymmetry. Our main research aim is to track the relationship from determinants to 
consequences. Accounting research often focuses on the determinants of a particular 
dimension of financial information quality (for instance, earning quality or, like here, a 
voluntary disclosure score) or on the consequences of the resulting financial information 
(Dechow et al. 2009). We try to disentangle the “complete path”, similarly to Bowen et al. 
(2008), who consider the question of earnings quality.  
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As Dechow et al. (2009) pointed out, the importance of the endogenously determined 
availability of non-earnings information (i.e., voluntary financial disclosure) raises questions 
about the association between earnings quality and the market consequences of financial 
information. Voluntary disclosure may be endogenously set and the complete path approach 
may be only partial if we show that voluntarily disclosed information plays a strategic role as 
complementary information. This role develops at the firm level in a voluntary 
communication policy.  
  
The paper shows that at least some firms design a communication policy and adopt a 
long-term perspective in following the policy. We do not find a simple negative and 
mechanical relationship linking the voluntary disclosure score and the error or dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts. Moreover, the year 2005, when the IFRS were introduced in the European 
Union, does not show any global break in the voluntary disclosure scores. In some situations, 
for weakly communicative firms, the score does not help to enrich forecasts. The information 
delivered in these situations is pure noise. When considering highly communicative firms, the 
score negatively impacts the dispersion of forecasts and helps to reduce information 
asymmetry. It leads analysts to question the communication policy in terms of trustfulness 
and to check if any effect of reputation may  qualify the voluntarily delivered information. In 
that sense, our results are in line with the “commitment to transparency” and the “label 
adopter” hypotheses (Daske et al., 2009). 
 
Our empirical study confirms that the disclosure of voluntary information develops in 
a dynamic, long-term process defining a communication policy. Voluntary disclosure itself 
selectively reduces the asymmetry of information in the financial market. We show that 
highly communicative firms should differ from others. Comparing the effect of the IFRS and 
the firm-specific effect, we show that the dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ forecasts are 
more strongly influenced by a firm-specific effect than they are by the switch to the IFRS. 
This relationship is highlighted in the context of long-term strategic communication policy. 
Our score methodology and data collected over a relatively long period of time (2003-2008) 
allow us to capture this long-term firm-specific policy. The empirical results support the idea 
that voluntary information disclosure and analysts’ forecasts are linked in a two-way 
relationship. Forecast errors and the asymmetry of information are not exogenous but 
endogenous in a communication policy framework. From a methodological point of view, we 
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recognize the endogenous setting of communication policy using panel systems of 
simultaneous equations. To our knowledge, this approach has not been previously been used.  
 
The paper is structured in the following way. The first section reviews the literature. 
The second section will present the score of voluntary disclosure, which is a genuine proxy of 
quantitative communication. The third section presents the hypothesis, and the fourth presents 
the empirical results. A conclusion follows. 
 
 
1- Review of the literature  
 
Financial communications fulfill legal or statutory obligations and aim at increasing 
the visibility and the valuation of a company with regard to a target public. A definition with 
regard to mandatory standards is proposed by Depoers (2000), who distinguishes between 
financial communication and financial information. She defines financial information as all 
legal obligations of publications; thus, financial communication constitutes "a space of 
freedom, a room for discretionary choices, which the manager can exploit to modify the 
accounting image of his company" (also Dye, 1985; Raffournier, 1995). For instance, Gabteni 
(2009) chooses to consider financial communication as any strategic and non-mandatory set 
of information disclosed by an issuing company to any of its stakeholders.  
 
The idea of information quality refers to the capacity to reproduce a reality in a way 
that is not biased either by the perception and the judgments of the issuer or by the form that 
makes this reality understandable (Michaïlesco, 2009). The quality of accounting and 
financial information is also defined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 
which specifies that accounting information is of good quality when it meets the relevance, 
reliability, comprehensibility and comparability conditions. In addition, we should take into 
account the constant evolution of the financial information standards in many countries, 
particularly in France. Indeed, it would seem that it is becoming harder and harder to 
distinguish what depends on financial information and what depends on voluntary financial 
communication. De Bruin (1999) and Léger (2008) agree that the boundary between these 
two notions is hardly perceptible. 
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1.1 Causes and determinants 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) focus on the determination of accounting standards and, 
more specifically, on pressures leading to the development of such standards. For example, 
the IFRS accounting standards encourage greater transparency in financial statements and 
better comparability of accounts between companies. They are exogenous and discrete 
deterministic changes that introduce a new regime in firms’ financial information choices. As 
a consequence of mandatory new accounting standards, firms become more visible and 
therefore more exposed to potential costs. The new IFRS introduce a change of regime in the 
cost/benefit equilibrium with regard to the delivered financial and accounting information. 
One way to overcome this increased exposure could be to disclose more voluntary 
information to protect the outside image of the firm. Voluntary disclosure can then be 
described as strategic behavior in the sense of Waterhouse, Gibbins and Richardson (1990). 
Voluntary information disclosure, understood as a strategic behavior, implies the three 
following conditions:  
- There is a network composed of at least two actors, and information is distributed 
asymmetrically. One of the two actors is the manager of the firm, whereas the second may be 
an investor, a competitor, a regulator or a pressure group. Of these two actors, one can decide 
whether to disclose the financial information he holds.   
- There is a communication channel between the two actors. The key considerations 
are whether this channel should be used and what kind of information should be transmitted.  
- The players’ rewards are interdependent and conditioned by disclosures.  
 
The task of a financial regulatory authority or of regulations is to efficiently solve 
agency conflicts that may arise between investors and managers (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Thus, we can question the ability of IFRS to reduce information asymmetry among firms. 
Several studies have investigated this last issue and confirmed the hypothesis that financial 
publication regulations provide investors with new and relevant information (Hope, 2003; 
Byard et al., 2011). However, it is difficult to isolate the impact of IFRS on the quality of 
financial information. Chen et al. (2010) compare the quality of the financial information of 
listed companies in the 15 member states of the European Union. To measure the quality of 
the information, they use several proxies, such as earnings management, discretionary 
accruals, accrual quality and earnings smoothing measures. They find a difference between 
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pre- and post-IFRS adoption. The general business environment and institutional features of 
financial markets are not found to be highly significant in explaining this evolution. 
 
One of the main challenges to financial communication, understood as a strategic 
decision, refers to the reduction of the information asymmetries existing between the firm and 
its stakeholders. Alphonse and Hallot-Gauquié (2003) show that meetings of financial 
analysts with French listed firms are followed by a significant decrease in information 
asymmetry. Similarly, Healy and Palepu (2001) outline theoretical reasons why disclosures 
may mitigate the agency problems in the firm. They consider that disclosures will enable 
firms to capture potential informative and incentive problems that may exist between 
managers and investors. Managers are encouraged to follow a disclosure strategy when they 
intend to make an issue in the market and to reduce the external financing cost of their 
company. Therefore, one of the leading motivations of listed companies engaged in a strategic 
disclosure process is the reduction of information asymmetry and the reduction of the cost of 
capital (Diamond and Verrecchia,, 1991; Verrecchia, 1994).  
 
Other studies confirm the link between voluntary disclosure practices and public 
offering of assets (Lang and Lundholm, 1993 and 1997, Healy et al., 1999). Managers will 
disclose more strongly in the period before the proposed public offering, but this approach to 
reducing information asymmetry is likely to generate a market misperception of the signal 
constituting the proposed public offering (Myers and Majluf 1984). Botosan (2006) 
investigates the link between disclosure level and the cost of capital. One of the main 
outcomes is that a high level of disclosure generates a lower cost of capital for a sample of 
firms followed by relatively few analysts. Conversely, firms followed by many analysts do 
not show a significant relationship between the disclosure level and the cost of capital. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) consider the relationship between the cost of capital and three 
possible categories of publications: annual reports, quarterly reports and other publications. 
They find a negative relationship between the cost of capital and the level of publication in 
the annual report. Conversely, there is a positive relationship between the cost of capital and 
the disclosure level in more frequent reports, such as quarterly reports.  
 
The signal theory brings about a new issue: even if the disclosed information is shared 
by all, it is nevertheless not necessarily perceived by all in the same way. Verrecchia (1983) 
shows that managers’ discretionary policy is influenced by issuing information costs. The 
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firm’s investors are aware of the existence of private information held by the managers. The 
manager may publish or hold the information he has; this decision is a signal for the asset 
value. However, the disclosure of information held by the manager will reduce the asset’s 
future value in the sense that there is a disclosure cost. Verrecchia (1983) states that the cost 
of publication may be of two distinct natures, direct or indirect: direct costs are related to the 
preparation, verification and dissemination of information, whereas indirect costs, known as 
proprietary costs, include all of the risks incurred by the company because of the publication 
of such information (e.g., increased competition and increased political visibility). Verrecchia 
(1983) outlines that firms prefer to publish only favorable information that increases the 
firm’s value. Uninformed investors are unable to distinguish between firms. They are in a 
position where they do not know whether the firm is hiding bad news. Similarly, Dye (1985) 
postulates that if investors have no certainty about managers’ withholding of private 
information, they cannot interpret the absence of information as a sign that the firm in 
question is withholding bad news. Both Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985) conclude that 
managers disclose only good news, with bad news being disclosed only if the disclosure cost 
is low enough or if the information asymmetry between the firm and its investors is 
sufficiently high.  
 
La Porta et al.’s (1998) analysis underlines the role of investors’ protection. In a 
dispersed ownership context such as the USA, Baek et al. (2009) show that share ownership 
does not influence financial communication as measured by the S&P transparency index. 
Results are similar in other countries, even where ownership is more concentrated, such as 
Singapore (Eng and Mak, 2003) and Canada (Ben-Amar and Benjenoui, 2008). However, in 
France, a negative relation is identified between concentrated capital ownership and the 
quality of financial communication (Labelle and Schatt, 2005; Lakhal, 2006; Ben Ali, 2008). 
Institutional investors may also influence the financial communication of the firm. Healy et al. 
(1999), Bushee and Noe (2000) and Beak et al. (2009) highlight the positive relationship 
between institutional investors’ ownership and financial disclosure or transparency of firms, 
at least in an Anglo-Saxon context. In France, the empirical results vary: positive for Lakhal 
(2006) and insignificant for Ben Ali (2008, 2009). 
 
1.2 Consequences 
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Verrecchia (2001) first set forth the voluntary disclosure theory. His work was 
motivated by the fact that voluntary disclosure is an eclectic topic that borrows from 
accounting, finance and economics. Verrecchia proposes three avenues of research:  
(i) The consequences of disclosure on investors’ behavior, more precisely through the 
reactions of stock prices and trading volumes. This first field of research is called 
"association-based disclosure”.  
(ii) The “discretionary-based disclosure approach” follows the idea that if the 
managers’ objective is maximizing the market value of the firm and there are costs of 
publishing information, then a balance is achieved only when information is released 
that increases the market value of the firm.  
(iii) The study of preferred disclosure channels in the absence of previous knowledge. 
This third line of research is called "efficiency-based disclosure”. More specifically, 
work on efficiency-based disclosure focuses on a possible link between disclosure and 
information asymmetry reduction. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and 
Verrecchia (1994) state that voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetries 
between the informed and uninformed investors.  
 
The decision to voluntarily publish accounting and financial information is subject to a 
cost/benefit analysis. The costs are the costs to produce, certify and disseminate information. 
Opportunity costs should also be considered, with eventuality costs linked to weakening of 
competitiveness or advantages (Verrecchia, 2003). The benefits of voluntary disclosure come 
from its consequences. It helps in reducing the uncertainty and information asymmetry faced 
by investors. It may also lower the cost of capital.  
 
Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005) analyze the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and the cost of capital. Previous works (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrechia, 2001) 
highlight that disclosure tends to reduce adverse selection costs and information asymmetry 
between managers and outside investors. Francis et al. (2005) notice the possible relationship 
between additional information disclosure and the cost of capital reduction in the U.S. market, 
where investors are highly protected (La Porta et al. 1998) and firms have easy access to 
external financing. Questioning if the results found in the U.S. market may be extended to 
markets with different legal and financial systems, Francis et al. (2006) check whether 
disclosure reduces information asymmetries in other institutional environments. They 
consider a sample of 672 observations from 34 countries with different financial and legal 
9 
 
systems. All firms in their sample show high disclosure levels if they have large financial 
needs, and strongly disclosing firms benefited from low equity and debt costs. Gassen and 
Selhorn (2006) analyze the consequences of voluntary IFRS adoption by German firms. They 
point out a decline in bid-ask spreads and an increased volatility of stock prices for IFRS 
adopters compared with other firms. Differences in earnings quality between the two groups 
are also highlighted.   
 
1.3 Information environment and communication policy 
 
The information environment has been known to be important since the early works of 
Brown (1983), who examines the impact of accounting methods on earnings predictability. 
The latter is traditionally measured by analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion. Other studies, 
like Elliott and Philbrick (1990), show more mixed results. In the context of IFRS 
introduction, Byard et al. (2011) demonstrate that IFRS do not curb forecast errors entirely. 
The global legal influence is strongly moderated by firm-specific variables. In the same way, 
Daske et al. (2009) study IFRS adoption by international companies. They identify a 
communication policy commitment from a group of firms that appear as “label adopters”. As 
a consequence, these firms, considered as “transparent”, will show a reduction in the 
information asymmetry level. Following Dechow et al. (2009), “if we assume that analysts are 
unbiased and qualified predictors of future earnings, we can use variation in their forecasts to 
infer attributes of earnings that improve its predictability” (p.136). The tests will then appear 
as joint tests of the analysts’ system efficiency and quality of information. 
 
Amir and Lev (1996) introduce the financial information “informativeness” idea. They 
study industries where “informativeness” is low and where non-financial information is used 
and is relevant. It suggests a balancing complementary mechanism. Francis et al. (2002) 
analyze the idea that competing information from analysts will complement and erode the 
“informativeness” of earnings. Firms supplement poor fundamental informativeness with 
additional information (Chen et al. 2002; Lougee and Marquartt, 2004). Informativeness level 
seems to depend on industry and other firm characteristics, such as age, existence of losses 
and analysts’ forecast errors. The idea is that voluntary information is disclosed in a global 
setting. The management of the informativeness of earnings is analyzed in Dechow et al. 
(2009).  
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The decision to develop a communication policy will lead some firms to disclose 
earnings quality or other elements of information that are more “informative” than others’ 
information. This fundamental quality is attached either to the earnings or, as in this article, to 
the mandatory accounting information. This quality may be complemented, balanced, or 
integrated is a more global setting. The basic idea is that disclosure decisions are (partially) 
endogenously determined by the quality of the “official” financial information produced 
elsewhere or by mandatory channels. As Dechow et al. (2009) note, voluntary disclosure may 
be endogenously determined. So we need a “complete path” approach to allow for the 
possibility of a feedback effect in testing the association between the level of accounting and 
financial disclosure and the market consequences of financial information. We must first 
proxy the level of voluntary financial disclosure by calculating a publication score.  
 
2 - The construction of a voluntary publication score  
 
The context of the paper is the balance between a macro-level exogenous norm (the 
mandatory standards) and the micro-level idiosyncratic behaviors of delivering genuine 
information to financial investors. We must first build a publication score. 
 
2.1. Methodology and previous studies 
 
The first study in which a score was calculated to quantify firms’ voluntary 
publication of financial information was conducted by Cerf in 1961 in the U.S. market. He 
looked at the annual reports of 25 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and showed that the voluntary disclosure of information was positively associated with firm 
size, the number of shareholders, and the profitability level. In 1971, inspired by Cerf, Singhvi 
and Desai studied information disclosed in the annual reports of U.S. firms by calculating a 
score index from 34 voluntary disclosure items. The results obtained confirm firm size, the 
number of shareholders and profitability as voluntary disclosure determinants. Buzby (1974) 
offered an analysis of 88 U.S. firms’ annual reports during the year 1971. He built a list of 38 
items related to financial and non-financial disclosure that were supposed to be disclosed in 
the annual reports of the entities considered. The relative importance of each of the 38 items 
was determined by a preliminary survey using questionnaires to financial analysts. Many 
authors (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976; McNally, Eng and 
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Hasseldine, 1982) have addressed the question of weighting items. Buzby’s results show a 
low correlation between the utility of items as recognized by financial analysts and their 
publication by firms under study. In other words, the information disclosed by the companies 
is uncorrelated with user expectations. Tables 1 and 2, presented below, provide an overview 
of the literature related to voluntary disclosure scores in the U.S. and international markets, 
respectively.  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
 
2.2. Design of a voluntary disclosure score for French firms in the pre-/post-IFRS 
period 
 
Our approach to constructing a voluntary disclosure score is to identify, from legal and 
accounting standards and current financial regulations, a series of "optional" items for which 
publication is not mandatory. Once this list is established, we will compare it to the annual 
reports of the sample firms.  
 
Common to our analysis and others is that the annual report remains the fundamental 
document for calculating the voluntary disclosure score. Bertrand (2000) explains the primacy 
of the annual report by the fact that it is a central source of information that is easily available 
and accessible. A very large number of studies on the quality or scope of information are 
cross-sectional analyses that calculate scores based on a single annual report and therefore 
refer to a given year. We follow the voluntary disclosure strategies of the SBF 120 listed 
companies during each of the years in the 2003-2008 period. The choice of study period is 
justified by the fact that we aimed to observe the companies’ financial communication 
strategy both before and after IFRS.  
 
The first step is to set up the list of optional information items. The compilation of the 
list of voluntarily disclosed items to be searched for within the content of the annual reports is 
a key point in the literature. To proceed, we have to consider the informational context of the 
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IAS-IFRS. Therefore, we first consider the lists used in the literature, excluding the lists 
developed in the North American context. These are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
 
Based on the lists of items developed in the literature, we compiled a list of 40 items 
that may go beyond simple mandatory information. When the information item is present in a 
firm’s annual report, the value 1 is given (0 otherwise). As a result, each firm for each year is 
given an individual score ranging from 0 to 40. However, we should remark that these lists 
have been developed in informational environments different from the IFRS because they 
refer mainly to periods before the introduction of the IFRS. 
 
2.3. Sample 
 
The sample is composed of listed firms belonging to the French SBF 120 index. The 
initial sample therefore consisted of the 120 listed companies comprising in the SBF 120. 
Banks, finance companies and insurance companies were excluded because these companies 
are subject to specific informational requirements. We excluded from our sample firms that 
were not listed in the index over all six years of the study period. Individual firms in the 
sample are present in the sample for all six years, except for two firms with observations 
missing only for the year 2008 (Clarins and Thomson). The final sample consists of 67 
companies operating within the SBF 120 index during all years from 2003 to 2008. Table 4, 
presented below, gives the details. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
 
The selected study period is the interval before and after the introduction of the IFRS. 
We specifically analyze the annual reports of the firms in the sample during the years 2003 
and 2004 for the period prior to the transition to IFRS and for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 
for the period after the move to IFRS. It should be noted that the year of the transition to 
IFRS, the year 2005, is also examined. The research involves comparing over time the score 
13 
 
of the annual reports or reference documents of the 67 firms in the sample. The content 
analysis focuses on the study of 400 annual reports, or the so-called “document de réference” 
(when available) of the SBF 120 companies, which are posted on the website of the French 
Financial Markets Authority (AMF). We compiled approximately 135,000 pages of 
documents.  
 
 
2.4. Setting the scope of a global index 
 
Forty items from the global list were searched for in the documents from the 67 firms 
in the sample. When information related to a given item was present in the annual report, the 
value 1 was given (0 otherwise). The number of hits is the number of times a given item was 
disclosed over the six-year period. The maximum score for a specific item is 400. The total 
number of potential disclosures of information is 16000 (i.e., 400x40) considering the whole 
sample. The cumulated number of recorded hits is 10402. In other words, 65.01% of the 
potential set of relevant voluntary information is effectively disclosed. 
 
Looking at Table 5, we see that many items are systematically disclosed to investors. 
Items 6 and 24 were publicized 399 times of a possible 4002. The number of employees (item 
39) was always indicated. These elements of information are quasi-mandatory in French 
annual reports. This result raises the question of the scope of items to consider. When 
considering the total number of mentions of a given item of information for any firm and any 
year, we see that some items are systematically reported, with more than 350 occurrences (of 
a theoretical maximum of 400). This is the case for items 1, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35 and 39. On the other hand, some items are rarely reported: items 2, 3, 4, 
16, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 31. However, the items with no or very scarce information should not 
be dropped. For instance, items 2 and 3 deal with forecasting of profits and are very poorly 
documented3. However, these are very important pieces of information. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
                                                 
2
 The total number of 67 firms time 6 years of annual report gives 400 firm/year observations 
if we remove the two firms absent in 2008. 
3
 The reason may be that making explicit forecasts of future profit may engage the firm’s 
responsibility vis-à-vis its shareholders. 
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To create a global score, we need to address the two related issues of (i) the scope of 
the individual items considered to build the score and (ii) their possible weights in the global 
score’s calculation. A simple equal weighting is commonly used in the literature (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989). Weights are sometime used, but rarely in a rigorous way. 
The voluntary disclosure items have different utilities for different user groups; thus, relative 
weights as a function of the importance of each item to specific user groups, defined as 
auditors, bankers, chartered accountants or financial analysts, may be used. This method was 
chosen in particular by Cerf (1961). 
 
We try to justify the calculation and the scope of the global score used hereafter. A 
principal components analysis (PCA) of the 67 firms and the large set of 40 items was 
performed. We choose to add the individual scores of each item per firm in a 67x40 matrix4. 
The first principal component (PC1) appears very strong and explains 89.4% of the variance. 
The second component is far behind, with 1.4% of the variance. Based on this result, we 
privilege simple arithmetic calculation to an arbitrary weighting. The choice of a simple 
average is justified by the very strong correlation between the average score based on an 
arithmetic 40-item average score and the first principal component. The R-squared value 
between the former and the equally weighted scores is 0.91. 
 
We select now a list of 28 items based on the literature on voluntary disclosure items 
relevant to the IFRS accounting framework. If an item was mentioned twice in the previous 
literature, we decided to keep it (following McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; Firer and 
Meth, 1986). However, we acknowledge that the lists of items in this literature do not refer to 
the IFRS standards. The lists presented in Table 3 were developed in informational contexts 
different from the IFRS context. It seems appropriate to consider the selected items one by 
one with regard to the IFRS to check if we can still consider them as voluntary disclosure 
items. To do this, we used as support the FOCUSIFRS website, established jointly by the 
High Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the national organizations of 
auditors, which identifies all texts relating to IFRS. For instance, items 6, 14, 34 and 35 are 
mandatory or quasi–mandatory according to IFRS rules, so they were dropped. Items 5, 12, 
17, 23, 24, 25, 33 and 36 were not cited twice or more in our review of the literature. We 
decided to drop these items because we concluded that they were not totally voluntary or not 
                                                 
4
 This matrix cumulates the number of occurrence of an item through the years 2003 to 2008.  
This summing avoids handling a three dimension matrix items/firms/years. 
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commonly referred to in the literature. Thus, after analyzing the voluntary nature of each 
voluntary disclosure item, our second list of optional items is limited to 28 voluntary 
disclosure items. As a result, each firm for each year is given an individual score ranging from 
0 to 28.  
 
We performed a PCA on the reduced 28-item score matrix. The first principal 
component explained 88.1% of the global variance. The equally weighted 28-item score was 
calculated and compared to the PC1 results. The R-squared between the two is 0.88, 
indicating that our 28-item score mimics the first principal component well. 
 
- Robustness check and alternative scores 
 
We tried to employ a statistical rather than a conceptual analysis to define the scope of 
relevant items. We considered the results of the 40-item PCA and neglected 11 items 
correlated to the PC1 with a coefficient below 0.10 in absolute value. A low coefficient means 
that the item contributes poorly to the first principal component. These are items 2, 3, 4, 5, 16, 
18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 31. Eliminating these 11 items leaves 29 remaining items. We 
calculated an arithmetical 29-item score for each firm. As in the previous analysis, a PCA 
using this subset yielded a very significant PC1, with an R-squared value of 0.92 between the 
29-item score and the first component. However, this score ignores some items that are 
conceptually important with regard to voluntary disclosure. Item 2 (although rarely disclosed) 
deals with qualitative information on future profits. Item 4 give the same information for 
future cash flows. Advertising expenses, returns on invested capital and cash ratios are also 
ignored. Because of these drawbacks, we did not consider the 29-item score calculation 
further. 
 
Another score was built on a set of 35 items by deleting those in the 40-item list that 
are mandatory under the IFRS rules, i.e., items 6, 11, 14, 34 and 355. We explored a 35-item 
score with equal weights and compared it to the results of a PCA. The first component 
explained 90% of the total variance. The equally weighted 35-item score is consistent with the 
first component. Their correlation is very high, with an R-squared of 0.88. Table 5 identifies 
                                                 
5
 The average number of answers of these 5 items is 366.4 compared to a maximum of 400 
answers. The information is delivered 92% of the time with regard to these items. 
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the items belonging to the 28-, 29- and 35-item scores. Table 6 presents the results of the PCA 
of each of the individual scores based on different numbers of items.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
Globally, we conclude that arithmetical scores are highly consistent with the data and 
mimic well the first principal component of the global scoring system. Considering the scope 
of the items, we privilege the 28-item score because of its conceptual rationale with regard to 
the IFRS. It is strongly correlated with other scores envisaged in this section (see Table 7). 
Hereafter, the 28-item score will be used as the global score. Alternatively, we cross-checked 
the results of this paper using the 35-item score. This less parsimonious global score index 
leads to similar results (not reported). 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
2.5 Disclosure of financial information: Descriptive analysis 
 
The descriptive summary of the 400 annual reports (or “documents de réference”, if 
available) is presented in Table 86. This prompts a number of comments about conditions 
under which the companies in our sample increased the volume of their voluntary disclosure 
during the period of 2003-2008. Conversely, the results reflect a relative decline in voluntary 
disclosure activity during 2007, two years after the official transition to the IFRS. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
 
If we average the score indexes over the 67-firm sample, we get similar evolution from 
2003 to 2008. The score increases up to 2006, then declines moderately (or stays flat) in 2007 
and, finally, increases in 2008. The four average score curves show similar patterns. An 
increase is also evidenced when considering the median values. Figure 1 shows an upward-
sloping voluntary disclosure score regardless of the type of score we refer to. We do not see 
any instantaneous shift around 2005. However, we do not know if the increase is due to the 
IFRS transition, if it can be explained by a historical and deterministic evolution, or both. If a 
                                                 
6
 The “document de référence” is a more complete statement than the legal annual report. It is 
asked and approved by the French Financial Market Authority when a financial operation 
involving investors occurs.   
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historical trend is effective, it would have to have found its momentum before 2005, the year 
of the transition to IFRS. The evolution of financial communication among our sample firms 
may be the result of both the transition to IFRS and a historical trend of development. The 
global upward trend is not monotonic, with a (relative) decrease of the average score in 2007. 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
 
A global test of the difference between the pre-2005 and the post-2005 40-item scores 
shows a significantly increasing score. We added the individual scores for 2003 and 2004 and 
the individual scores for 2006-2007. The two are significantly different, with a t-statistic of 
3.52 (p-value: 0.00). Similar results are obtained when using the 28-, 29- and 35-item scores. 
The results globally support the idea that the level of voluntary disclosure was not the same 
before and after 2005, which is the year of the mandatory application of the IFRS norms. 
However, Figure 1 does not show an abrupt increase but a continuously rising average score. 
The voluntary disclosure of information may be not due to the exogenous mandatory IFRS 
application in the 2005 financial report. We cannot exclude the possibility that voluntary 
disclosure follows a time deterministic trend. As time passes, firms are more and more 
inclined to disclose financial information voluntarily. Exogenous mandatory regulations are 
only one element among several explaining this trend.  
 
To develop this hypothesis, we calculated the correlation between the 2003-4 
individual score values and the 2006-7 scores for each firm. The correlation is positive and 
strong at 0.70. We also calculated the rank correlations of individual firms between the two 
periods to answer the question: was the most communicative firm in the 2003-4 period still 
the most communicative firm in the 2006-7 period? The rank correlation is 0.59, meaning that 
firms continue to disclose similar amounts of information over time.  
 
This result raises the possibility that voluntary disclosure is a long-term 
communication policy of a firm. It is one feature of the communication policy that is firm 
specific. We calculated the probability of changing the level of disclosure by separating the 
sample into two groups of firms: those with a score above the median, which are considered 
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high-disclosing, and those with a score below the median, which are considered low-
disclosing. Between the two sub-periods of 2003-4 and 2006-7, the median score increased 
from 50 to 53.  
 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
 
The highly communicative firms were likely to remain highly communicative even if 
an exogenous event such as the IFRS implementation occurred. On the other hand, the 
behavior is not symmetric. Most low-disclosing firms remained poorly communicative, but 
one third of them tried to change their policies. 
  
3 - Hypotheses and models 
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
 
Our goal is to examine the changes through time in the quantity of voluntary disclosed 
financial information. To analyze the financial communication policies of the French SBF 120 
firms before and after the implementation of IFRS, we need to question the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure. One goal of the IFRS standards is to clarify and to make more 
transparent the financial information offered to the public. A single change to a regulatory and 
normative framework is enough to modify the behavior, often strategic, of listed firms. The 
relationship is not causal and univocal. We need to address the issues of relevance, utility and 
quality of the delivered financial information. Firms can engage in strategic communication 
for idiosyncratic purposes. If such policies exist, they are built within a time dimension that 
may cover several instances of information reporting. They will also imply the behavior of 
those to whose attention the disclosure is targeted. Financial analysts are by definition those 
who focus on the communication policy of listed firms.  
 
The voluntary disclosure score is considered in the literature both as a score of 
quantity (Cooke, 1989; Barrett, 1976; Depoers, 2000), in that it allows a measure of voluntary 
disclosure, and as a qualitative measure of the voluntarily disclosed information (Cerf, 1961; 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971, Lang and Lundholm, 1993). A voluntary disclosure score may also 
measure the quality of the delivered information. However, the latter idea remains to be 
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tested, as firms that disclose more information do not necessarily deliver the highest quality 
information. 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean score values of 28, 29, 35 and 40 items. Their evolution is 
similar; a positive trend in voluntary disclosure appears for each. However, the idea of a trend 
indicates a deterministic global pressure that pulls the firms upward in the quantity of 
financial information that they deliver. This is how continuity over time is viewed. Behind the 
phenomenon is a permanent contextual and institutional pressure by the financial actors to get 
more information. Another explanation is that the adoption of the IFRS in 2005 introduced a 
change of regime in the policies of disclosure. In this case, firms reacted to a single event. To 
test this idea, we test the difference between the 2003-2004 scores and the 2006-2007 scores. 
It appears significant. However these are two point observations; both explanations, the 
change of disclosure due to IFRS and the deterministic long-term evolution, can explain this 
difference.  
 
Voluntary disclosure will depend positively on environmental pressure. The first 
hypothesis is: 
 
H1: The evolution in the quantitative score of disclosure is explained by an exogenous 
change dated by the introduction of IFRS rather than by a long-term trend evolution.  
 
As mentioned above, the voluntary disclosure of financial information may be 
explained by the regulatory context. It can also be determined by the firm’s characteristics. 
The offer of voluntary information is explained by a balance between costs and benefits 
(Verrecchia, 2003). We can hypothesize that visible firms will follow a voluntary 
communication policy. Big firms or members of the CAC 40 index may be more outstanding 
than other firms. Because of their larger size, they can spread out the cost of disclosure. Their 
size enhances the importance of their financial communication policy. High leverage and high 
risk will increase the demand for information by investors. Thus, a firm may disclose 
information to reduce the risk perceived by investors.  
 
H2(a): Voluntary disclosure is positively linked to firm size. A large firm or one 
belonging to the CAC index is more likely to have a voluntary communication policy. 
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H2(b): The publication score index is positively linked with leverage and the level of 
financial risk. 
 
Corporate governance and the structure of ownership may increase the need for 
information. Institutional investors holding blocks of shares may demand more financial 
information. Important shareholders will also exert pressure to disclosure more information. 
The relation between institutional investors and financial disclosure may be positive because 
large blockholders may want to assure outside investors and levy the idea of private benefits. 
It may also be negative because dominant shareholders may access private information 
directly at the firm level through other channels (e.g., boards), making public disclosure 
unnecessary. 
 
H3(a): The score index is increasing with institutional investors’ ownership. 
H3(b): The score index may be related positively or negatively to large shareholders’ 
ownership. 
  
Looking at the consequences of the disclosure, we can identify benefits in 
Verrecchia’s sense. The first is the reduction in information asymmetry. The dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts should be influenced by the score. The voluntary information delivered is 
useful for analysts and helps to reduce the asymmetry of information. It should improve the 
quality of analysts’ forecasts by reducing the absolute error between the current earnings 
announced by the firm and the average consensus forecasts. The alternative hypothesis is that 
the publication score includes information that is noisy or useless.  
 
H4: The score will be linked positively and negatively, respectively, with the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the errors in forecasting future earnings. 
 
The concept of communication policy demonstrates the endogenous relations between 
offers and demand. The voluntary offering of financial information may be explained by a 
high level of asymmetry of information and by important needs of investors. The score is the 
result of a communication policy. It results from a firm’s decision to commit itself to a 
communication policy over the long term. It is built on an idiosyncratic framework. A firm 
that communicates strongly now also did so in the past. We saw in the descriptive statistics 
that the rank correlation between scores pre- and post-IFRS is strong.  
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H5(a): The voluntary disclosure choice results from a long-term policy and has a long-
term autoregressive component.  
 
A dynamic relationship requires the firm also to answer to the pressure of financial 
analysts. The extent of the asymmetry of information leads the firm to issue voluntary 
information to analysts. The asymmetry of information may be measured by the dispersion of 
forecasts throughout the year or by the number of analysts. The endogenous roles of some 
variables can be tested.  
 
H5(b): The voluntary publication score is positively linked with the previous level of 
asymmetry of information and the number of analysts.  
 
- The role of a communication policy 
 
If H5 is true, communication policy should be viewed as a long-term filtering process 
in which financial information is disclosed. This process lends trustworthiness and a global 
framework to pieces of disclosed information. We can introduce a distinction between so-
called communicative firms, which follow such an approach, and other, less communicative 
firms. A high score indicates a willingness to disclose massively. The long-term perspective 
becomes apparent when comparing a firm’s scores though time. The communication policy 
gives “informativeness” to elements of information that are voluntarily disclosed. Otherwise, 
even voluntarily disclosed pieces of information may be of low quality or useless. At the 
limit, an untrustworthy voluntary disclosure of information is pure noise. 
  
H6: With useful disclosed information, the accuracy and the dispersion of forecasts 
should be negatively linked with the score index. 
 
However, the previous hypothesis does not introduce any difference in behaviors. 
Some firms may be highly communicative and reliable as a result of a trustful communication 
policy. Others may follow a weak or unreliable communication policy. When these firms 
issue voluntary information, it has no impact on the asymmetry of information. Dividing the 
sample into two parts, the probability of an above-median disclosing firm to remain above the 
median is a behavioral feature that signals a high-level communication policy.  
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H7: The existence of differences in communication policy may result in different 
reactions in the market’s asymmetry of information. Highly communicative firms will 
effectively influence the market’s asymmetry of information.  
 
3.2. Variables 
 
The dependent variable is the individual firm’s score in a given year, SCORE. We 
used the score index calculated with 28 items. We divided the sample in two parts to separate 
communicative and uncommunicative firms, where the former are those with a voluntary 
publication score above the median. We identify these firms as following a communication 
policy. SCOREDUMYEAR is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for highly 
communicative firms. For each year, we calculate the median score and identify the firms that 
scored above the median7. The cross interaction term SCOREHIGHYEAR gives the score 
value for only the highly communicative firms; it returns a zero value for other firms. On the 
analysts’ side, we consider the dispersion of forecast earnings (FOR_STD), the number of 
analysts issuing a forecast (NB_ANAL) and the mean accuracy of EPS forecasts (ACCUR). 
These data are provided by IBES and considered at the end of each fiscal year. We used the 
absolute value of the forecast error ACCUR and normalized by dividing it by the stock price 
at the end of the fiscal year (FOR_ACCUR_NORM). Normalization is necessary because the 
earnings per share are very different among firms. The same is true for FOR_STD. We 
divided it by the stock price to obtain the FOR_STD_NORM variable.  
 
The usual control variables are considered. The market risk of the firm (RISK_MKT) 
is measured by its beta coefficient. Market risk is preferred here because we focus on the 
consequences of information communication directed toward investors and the financial 
market. Beta coefficients are calculated yearly by taking weekly returns and regressing them 
on the returns of the SBF 120 stock index. Capital ownership structure is integrated through 
the institutional investors’ ownership (INST_OWN) and the percentage of capital held by the 
three major shareholders (TOP_3). The size of the firm is measured by the logarithm of the 
total assets (LNTA); the debt leverage is the long-term debt ratio over the book capital value 
                                                 
7
 Using the median of the whole sample will bias the variable in favor of observations belonging to the most 
recent part of the sample. 
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(LT_DT_OV_CAP). The market-to-book ratio (MTB) and the operating profit margin 
expressed in percentage (OP_MARGIN) were also considered. We used the ICB large 
industry sector classification codes of Thomson Financial. A dummy CAC variable was used 
to flag firms that are members of the first-tier CAC 40 index. A trend variable (TREND) was 
created to indicate the year. A dummy IFRS was added that takes the value 0 before IFRS 
enforcement (i.e., in 2003 and 2004) and 1 thereafter. We have data on a sample of 64 firms 
throughout the 2003-2008 period (see Table 10). The descriptive statistics of the variables are 
presented in Table 11.  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 10  
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 11 
 
3.3. Models 
 
In a first look at the data, we consider them as randomly distributed in the time 
dimension. We may consider them as a set of independent observations to get a first insight 
into the variables explaining the value of SCORE. We do not input any preset time dimension 
into the data to explain the score values. We integrate a time dimension only by imputing 
either the TREND variable or the dummy IFRS as an explanatory variable. 
 
We used a Poisson regression of the SCORE variable to suit the structure of the score 
values, which are not continuous. The model is highly significant. The control variables used 
are dispersion of forecasts, size, number of analysts, leverage, equity ownership by 
institutional investors, ownership concentration, forecast accuracy and market risk. Both the 
TREND and IFRS variables’ coefficients are significant. They have the expected sign of an 
increase in the score index with time. However, we cannot discriminate between them. We do 
not consider the sign of other variables here because the model is not suitable. We also 
checked the results using an ordered Logit model to explain the score values using the same 
set of control variables and obtained the same results. We can conclude that the score of 
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voluntary disclosure has a significant time dimension and is increasing with time. Thus, a 
panel model must be used. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 12  
 
 
The remainder of the empirical study will use panel analysis. A test to confirm the 
individual effects of the 64 firms and a time effect of the 6 years was performed. The SCORE 
variable has a panel data structure, as does forecast accuracy. The dispersion of forecasts 
(FOR_STD_NORM) does not demonstrate significant differences between individual firms or 
between years.  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 13 
 
4 Empirical results 
 
4.1. Determinants of the voluntary disclosure score 
 
To explain the disclosure score, we use a panel regression analysis with individual 
effects. We model the time effect explicitly by considering either the TREND or the IFRS 
variable. This approach allows us to question the nature of the time effect. Allowing a simple 
time effect in the panel model would introduce dummies for each of the 6 considered years. 
By doing so, we would not have been in a position to determine the nature of the time effect, 
i.e., whether it is a deterministic trend or pre-/post-IFRS decision. To set up the model, we 
had to choose between fixed (intercept) effects and random effects. We used random effects 
in a first trial because it is the less constrained model. We then tested the final specification 
against a fixed effects intercept using Hausman’s test. The difficulty with the SCORE variable 
is that it is discontinuous and has limited range. We checked whether the SCORE variable has 
a normal distribution. Globally, it shows significant skewness, but we can reject the kurtosis 
hypothesis at the 1% level. The Jarque-Bera statistic is not significantly different from zero 
(p=0.00), and we reject normality. However, looking at annual score data, normality prevails. 
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We cannot reject normality for four years out of six (at the 5% level). Non-normal score 
values are identified in 2005 and 2006. Because score is the dependent variable, we checked 
that the residuals of the regression did not show abnormal distributions.  
 
The M1 and M2 regressions include many explanatory variables and refer to industry 
dummies; they only differ in whether the time dimension is modeled with TREND or with 
IFRS. The models M3 and M4 do not include industry dummies. The results are similar to the 
previous ones except that the constant becomes significant. Both TREND and IFRS are 
significant. We still cannot discriminate between them. The analysts’ forecast dispersion, 
forecast error, leverage, CAC membership, the number of analysts and institutional investors’ 
ownership or ownership concentration variables are not significant in explaining the score of 
voluntary disclosure. The risk variable is positive and significant in one instance. The only 
significant variables are the increasing time dimension characteristics (TREND or IFRS) and 
the past disclosure score value SCORE(-1), i.e., the previous value of the score index. 
Autoregressive scores confirm a long-term communication policy. A highly communicative 
firm will continue to be highly communicative in the following year.  
 
The models M5 to M7 have different dependent variables. We now look at DSCORE, 
which is the yearly variation in the disclosure score. We introduce lagged variables of forecast 
accuracy, which are moderately significant. The past forecast errors made by the analysts 
seem to explain the variation in the disclosure score. A large error in the last-year forecast will 
imply a higher score, i.e., a more disclosure. This is coherent with our hypothesis H4.  
 
The models M8 to M10 again explain the score. We test the idea that the past value of 
the forecast errors or forecast dispersion will explain the future level of disclosure. The two 
variables FOR_ACCUR_NORM(-1) and FOR_STD_NORM(-1) are not significant. Only the 
autoregressive component is significant, along with the effect of industry dummies (see model 
8). The M9 and M10 models test the random fixed effect in the panel model. The set of 
explanatory variables does not refer to industry because it would be redundant with the fixed 
individual effect, which introduces a fixed constant for each firm. The Hausman test rejects 
the fixed intercept coefficients specification (F=1.22, p-value of 0.28). The beta coefficients 
are not significantly different, so we prefer the less constrained model, i.e., the random effects 
model. The normality of residuals is rejected at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level, for most 
models, particularly the M9 regression. Variation in score models (M5 to M7) show non-
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normal residuals. In any cases, the rejection results from the presence of kurtosis and not from 
skewness.  
 
The variable linked to the financial riskiness of the firm is conclusive only if we refer 
to a time dimension featured by the IFRS dummy; it is not significant otherwise. The leverage 
does not explain the disclosure levels. The ownership structure variables (TOP3, INSTOWN) 
do not influence the setting of the communication policy. The asymmetry of information does 
not appear as a determinant; neither the forecast accuracy nor the number of analysts are 
significant. Introducing the previous value of the information asymmetry variable does not 
appear to be useful. When considering whether to use the IFRS dummy or the TREND 
variable, we get similar results with similar significance. With the exception of an increase 
with time and a positive autoregressive component, other explanatory variables seem to 
contribute little. Some are weakly significant. When looking at the fixed effect estimates, we 
find similar results, although the autoregressive component of the score index is less 
significant (see Table 14). 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 14  
 
Each firm’s communication policy is peculiar to it and has a strong permanent form. 
This single-equation panel does not strongly identify any idiosyncratic determinants at this 
level. One reason for the poor result in terms of the explanatory variables is that the score 
level is endogenous but poorly captured in a simple equation, leading to one-way causality. 
This problem will become clearer later on.  
 
 
4.2. Analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. 
 
A complete model to analyze the disclosure scores of firms should take into account 
cross-relationships where the disclosure of information may also explain variation in the 
accuracy or the dispersion of forecasts. The causality may be complex and involve dynamic 
behaviors from firms that follow communication policies. 
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First, we analyze as the dependent variable the absolute mean forecast error, 
FOR_ACCUR_NORM. The higher its value, the lower its accuracy in anticipating earnings. 
The first model, M1, shows that the forecast error is negatively linked to the profitability of 
the firms, their risk, and their membership in the CAC stock index (see Table 15). It is 
positively linked with firm size and does not depend on the number of analysts. The 
explanation here is that large firms are generally complex, multidivisional or multinational. 
Their future earnings are more difficult to forecast. It is also interesting to point out that the 
characteristics of being a high communicator of financial information in the past (as appraised 
by the variable SCOREDUM(-1)) does not indicate any improvement in the following 
period’s accuracy. The model M2 highlights that the disclosure score index SCORE is 
negatively linked (only at the 5% level) with the forecast error. This result is weak because it 
is not confirmed in the other model specifications. This point is important, as it provides a 
way to test H6. Crucially, the relation is not lagged but contemporaneous. The disclosure of 
financial information is measured by the information delivered in the annual report at the end 
of the fiscal year. However, the annual report gathers all financial information, either newly 
disclosed or already announced throughout the year through other media; for example, 
presentations to analysts, public announcements, or material posted on the firm’s website. 
Voluntary disclosure is an attitude that does not lead the firm to retain useful pieces of 
information. Disclosure to the public is privileged when it is useful and disclosure may 
develop continuously. This explains why the contemporaneous correlation between the 
quantity of information voluntarily disclosed during the fiscal year up to the financial report 
delivery and the forecast error at the announcement of the actual earnings per share a few 
months after the fiscal year end, is negative8. The model M3 introduces the forecast 
dispersion FOR_STD_NORM as a positive and significant explanatory variable. This means 
that the analysts’ dispersion of forecasts is negatively linked to the accuracy of forecasts. 
Dispersion is a signal of an important asymmetry of information and the absence of 
consensus. It also accompanies forecast errors. The asymmetry of information covers the 
situation of underinformed analysts who differ systematically in their forecasting. This 
increases the dispersion of forecasts around the mean. As a result, the average error of the 
forecasts increases. Conversely, if everybody is equally informed or adopts herd behavior, 
dispersion is low. Errors of forecasts may exist but be randomly distributed over a sample of 
                                                 
8
 If, instead of SCORE, we use the previous year score value SCORE(-1), the score variable 
turns insignificant in model 2. 
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stocks9. The positive relation between FOR_STD_NORM and errors in forecasting is 
confirmed in models M5 and M6. The difference between them is the presence of a random or 
a fixed effect. The Hausman test accepts the equality of estimated coefficients (F= 0.93, 
p=0.48). We also highlight that the TREND and IFRS variables are equally significant. There 
is a time-increasing feature that makes the forecasting error lower and the accuracy higher 
with time. We cannot distinguish whether this is a global phenomenon linked to the 
institutional environment or if it is a consequence of the introduction of IFRS.  
 
INSERT TABLE 15 
 
The FOR_STD_NORM variable is a proxy of information asymmetry as perceived by 
analysts (see Table 15, lower part). We introduce the dummy SCOREDUM for highly 
communicative firms, as opposed to moderately communicative firms. It is not significant in 
model M1, but it is significant in models M2 and M3. It has the expected negative sign. A 
firm that was highly communicative in the previous period will lower the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts in the following year. This mechanical information-providing mechanism 
is only weakly significant at the 10% level. The SCORE(-1) variable is significant in models 
2 and 3, but weakly. Contrary to our expectations, it shows a positive sign. This result 
suggests that the delivery of financial information does not reduce, but increases, the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. However, we have to consider that the sign of SCORE(-1) is 
balanced by a significant negative sign of the dummy variable SCOREDUM(-1). The 
negative sign of the latter means that the delivery of information negatively impacts the 
dispersion of forecasts and reduces the market asymmetry of information, but only for 
communicative firms. This point does not confirm our offer-demand scheme, nor does it mean 
that the firm does not provide any information to the market to reduce asymmetry of 
information. It could mean that the information provided by the firm, even in increasing 
quantity, is not useful to the market. We reject the idea that the quantity of information is 
linked with its quality for all firms in the market. Information may be pure noise or useless if 
it does not reduce the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. On the other hand, models 2 and 3 
show a strong positive autoregressive component in the dispersion of forecasts. Coefficients 
around one are coherent with the idea that any stock is followed by a population of analysts 
that is stable from one year to the next. This explains why the fixed-effects model is not 
                                                 
9
 Except in the situation of a behavioral bias of systematic pessimism or overconfidence. 
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different from the random-effects panel specification when comparing models M2 and M3. 
The Hausman test rejects the fixed effect (F=0.47, p=0.86). The dispersion of forecasts has 
some persistence, which is not linked to peculiar characteristics of the firms. 
 
Some other results are not in line with the literature: Analysts’ dispersion is not a 
function of the number of analysts. Interestingly, the IFRS variable is also not significant. The 
introduction of IFRS did not reduce the asymmetry of information significantly.  
 
 
4.3 Endogeneity and systems of equations 
 
The univariate panel analyses described above showed that disclosure policy does not 
seem to be explained by the demand for information from the outside. Paradoxically, the 
characteristic of the demand for information by analysts is not significant either through the 
past error in forecasting or through asymmetry of information. This choice appears to be 
affected only by deterministic variables such as CAC membership. The model of forecast 
errors demonstrates that accuracy is influenced by the dispersion of forecasts and not by the 
disclosing policy of the firms. The asymmetry of information (as measured by 
FOR_STD_NORM) is influenced by a complex mix of determinants. It refers to the 
disclosure activity of the previous year. The linkage between the three aspects at this stage 
seems to be quite poor.  
 
This finding may be explained by the univariate methodology, which does not take 
into account potential endogenous relations. A joint setting is necessary when analyzing 
disclosure scores, forecast accuracy and the dispersion of forecasts. A system of joint panel 
data is estimated. We used four systems of joint equations. The first one is a system of two 
panel equations; the first equation (EQ1) explains the score value and the second equation 
(EQ2) explains the mean forecast error. The second system has three equations, the dependent 
variables of which are SCORE (EQ1), FOR_ACCUR_NORM (EQ2) and FOR_STD_NORM 
(EQ3). These two sets of equations use the TREND variable as the time dimension to explain 
the score in EQ1. The other two systems of equations are strictly similar to the previous one, 
with 2 and 3 equations each, respectively. The only difference is that EQ1 now uses the IFRS 
dummy. EQ1 stresses the offer of information by the firm through the score index. It has to do 
with the firm’s communication policy. The two other equations focus on the capacity of 
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analysts as a whole to forecast earnings. They identify the strength of the demand for 
information. 
  
 
INSERT TABLE 16 
 
The results of the multivariate panels are shown in Table 16. The estimates of the four 
systems agree with one another10. In EQ1, the disclosure score is now significantly (at the 5% 
level) linked to FOR_ACCUR(-1): a large error in the previous year’s forecast makes the firm 
voluntarily disclose more information in the following year. This result is new and did not 
appear in the univariate test. The disclosure activity has a permanent component and is part of 
a long-term policy. The value of SCORE at time t-1 is helpful for identifying a 
communication policy. The new score value is nearly 70% of the previous one. Considering 
this result, the market and analysts know that the firm will continue to communicate more 
than the required information. The results underline the dynamic process of communication. 
Disclosure follows a long-term policy. The firm also reacts by voluntarily delivering more 
information if the past forecasting error was important. It is explained by indirect costs 
associated with forecasting error (increased cost of financing, loss of reputation). Our 
hypothesis H5(a) is accepted, but H5(b) is not confirmed because the previous asymmetry of 
information does not result in higher publication scores.  
 
The only characteristic of the firms that explains disclosure better is the risk level, as 
measured by its beta. Neither profitability nor institutional investors’ investment or ownership 
concentration are significant. Size does not appear to be significant, although it influences the 
results indirectly through the firm’s listing on the CAC stock index. Our hypotheses H2 and 
H3 are partially and totally rejected, respectively. A deterministic time-increasing component 
is also highlighted. Ceteris paribus, firms will disclose more information with time. However, 
we cannot distinguish the cause of this trend. It may be explained by the introduction of IFRS 
standards, but it could also be explained by the pressure of the global environment11. In Table 
15, analysis of EQ1 shows that the TREND and the IFRS variables are only slightly 
significant; both are rejected at the 1% level. In that sense, we do not find results similar to 
                                                 
10
 The normality of the residuals of EQ1 is poor. It is rejected at the 5% level but not rejected at the 1% level.  
11
 We tested the model with at the same time the IFRS and the TREND variables. Both have positive but 
insignificant signs. 
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Chen et al. (2010), and we cannot draw a conclusion on H1 regarding the impact of the 
introduction of IFRS.  
 
The analysts’ forecasting accuracy is not influenced by the level of voluntary 
disclosure (see EQ2 in Table 15). The information delivered does not help improve the mean 
EPS forecast. Analysts’ forecasts will question the usefulness of the voluntarily disclosed 
information. On average, this information is pure noise. Accuracy does not improve with the 
number of analysts or with the size of the firm. Forecast accuracy is better if the firm belongs 
to the top-tier CAC stock index. Globally, accuracy improves with time (measured by either 
TREND or IFRS). The positive relation between FOR_STD_NORM and 
FOR_ACCUR_NORM is confirmed. The existence of dispersion in forecasts makes the 
forecasting error larger. This result is in line with the hypothesis of information asymmetry. 
 
The dispersion of forecasts latter aspect is analyzed by the third equation. The 
dispersion in individual analysts’ forecasts has a permanent component. It does not seem to 
decrease with time, particularly with the introduction of IFRS. The variable SCOREDUM(-1) 
is still significant (only at the 10% level) in a system setting. It has a negative sign, indicating 
that only highly communicative firms tend to generate lower dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
The score variable itself becomes nonsignificant. Disclosing information is not enough to curb 
information asymmetry. A simple one-way relationship between the quantity of information 
delivered and the reduction of information asymmetry is not evidenced. In that sense, we 
reject our hypothesis H4. We cannot simply validate the hypothesis that the quantity of “raw” 
information delivered globally to the market is useful information. Our results are in line with 
Byard et al. (2011) and underline the importance of the firm-specific disclosure policy. From 
the investors’ viewpoint, the disclosed information may be no help in understanding the firm. 
However, it is important to distinguish between highly communicative and moderately 
communicative firms. Among the former, information disclosure may reduce the conflict of 
interest. However, it may also add fuzziness and confusion in the market and does not reduce 
the asymmetry of information for poorly communicative firms. This finding suggests that 
only highly communicative and reliable firms effectively reduce the asymmetry of 
information by disclosing voluntary information. A policy of disclosing trustworthy 
information creates value and is useful. Such information is issued by communicative firms 
within a policy framework. Information coming from moderately communicative firms has no 
impact.  
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This result leads to the idea that we can identify different communication policies. On 
the one hand, some firms follow long-term high disclosure standards and appear as “label 
adopters” (Daske et al., 2009). The information they deliver to analysts will help to reduce the 
asymmetry of information and indirectly contribute to reducing forecast errors. In contrast, 
disclosing information voluntarily does not help when the firm is not identified as 
trustworthy. The information is then pure noise and does not help to reduce the situation of 
asymmetry or, indirectly, to improve the accuracy of forecasts.  
 
The disclosure score index, the forecasting accuracy and the dispersion of forecasts are 
endogenously related and have to be considered jointly. Our results lead to the idea that 
increasing voluntary information by delivering a significant quantity of information may 
result in pure noise. The hypothesis that the extra information mechanically improves the 
accuracy of forecasts or reduces the asymmetry of information is not accepted. The 
hypothesis H6 of a direct relationship is not accepted. However, the hypothesis H7 of a 
complex and indirect relationship is accepted. The market is sensitive to the communication 
policies of certain firms, but not all firms. Those firms that are globally good communicators 
and provide a large set of voluntary information will be identified, and the market reaction to 
their communication will be good, i.e., asymmetry of information will shrink. Those firms 
that are moderately communicative have only a small influence on the market’s perception. 
The voluntary information they disclose may be considered as noise. Our results may 
corroborate the idea that communication policies and reliability are filters with regard to the 
voluntary disclosure of quantitative information. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present research has two goals. It measured the voluntary disclosure of financial 
information through a quantitative proxy of financial and non-financial data measured by 28 
items. The publication scores are very different over time and between firms. The introduction 
of the IFRS affected the voluntary disclosure of information. The disclosure of information 
increased significantly over the 2003-2008 period. However, the increase seems to be 
explained by global pressure of the institutional environment as well as by the mandatory 
introduction of the IFRS in 2005. We could not separate the two effects.  
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Previous studies have analyzed firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior. We test the 
communication policies followed by some of the SBF 120 firms. We relate the publication 
score to analysts’ forecast errors and the existence of asymmetry of information, as measured 
by the dispersion of earnings per share in forecasts by financial analysts.  
 
A dynamic process of communication is evidenced in our empirical study. A 
distinction should be made between highly communicative firms following a long-term policy 
and others. Complex and idiosyncratic communication policies aimed at the reduction of 
asymmetry of information are the main driver of the disclosure of financial information. The 
communication policies of French firms are based on a long-term perspective. We saw a 
strong persistence in the level of the quantitative scores and in the level of asymmetry of 
information measured by the dispersion of earning forecasts. Communication is not limited to 
the delivery of quantitative pieces of information. Analysts (and the markets) will only react 
to useful information, i.e., information that is reliable and issued by trustworthy, highly 
communicative firms. The market process to filter out useful information issued by 
communicative firms in the framework of a global policy is the major finding of this paper. 
Future research should confirm the existence of this mechanism over a longer time period. 
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Table 1. Summary of studies using disclosure scores on the U.S. market 
 
Author Year Sample Items Comments 
Cerf 1961 258 firms listed on  NYSE 31 Positive relationship between disclosure and size, number of 
shareholder profitability 
Singhvi and Desai 1971 100 firms listed on NYSE 55 unlisted firms 34 
Firms issuing information correlated to user expectations 
(financial analysts) are audited by smaller audit firms, are 
less profitable, have more volatile prices than other firms. 
Buzby 1974 44 firms listed on NYSE 44 unlisted firms  39 
Existence of a weak correlation between the relative 
importance of the item and the level of disclosure 
Buzby 1975 44 firms listed on NYSE 44 unlisted firms  39 
Positive relationship between disclosures contained in the 
annual report and firm size. 
ack of relationship between disclosures and listing status 
Stanga 1976 80 firms listed on NYSE 79 Positive relationship between disclosures contained in the 
annual Report and industrial firms in the sample study. 
Garsombke 1979 100 firms listed on NYSE 34 Lack of relationship between disclosures contained in the 
annual report and the level of risk associated with the firm. 
Botosan 1997 122 manufacturing firms 
60  items 
structured 
into five  
categories 
For firms with a low analyst following, higher disclosure is 
linked with lower cost of equity capital. 
For firms with low analyst following, no link between 
disclosure lever and cost of equity capital 
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Table 2. Summary of research using disclosure scores on other markets (non US studies) 
 
Source Year Sample Number of items Comments 
Choi 1973 72 firm listed on European markets 36 The listing on a European financial market is generating improvements in the level of disclosure 
Barrett 1976 
15 US firms 
15 Japanese firms 
15 British firms 
15 French firms 
15 German firms 
15 Swedish firms 
13 Netherlands firms 
17 
The levels of disclosure in annual reports of American and British companies are 
significantly larger than those present in the annual reports of other companies in the 
study sample. 
Firth 1978 
250 CFOs 
250 accountants working for audit firms 
120 financial analysts 
130 bankers 
75 
The purpose of this study was to test the importance placed by different users to different 
items of publication. The results show that CFOs and auditors give equal weight to items 
/ financial analysts and bankers give equal weighting to the items. 
Firth 1980 278 British manufacturing firms 48 The small firms significantly increase their level of publication in the issuance of new 
securities. This relationship does not hold for large firms 
Firth 1984 100 British firms 48 The study results reflect the lack of significant relationship between the level of disclosure and systematic risk measured by beta. 
Chow et Wong-
Boren 1987 52 Mexican listed firms 24 The information voluntary disclosure level is higher for large firms than for small firms. 
Cooke 1989a 
38 Swedish unlisted firms 
33 firms listed on Swedish market 
19 companies listed both on the Swedish 
market and on at least one foreign 
market 
224 There is a positive relationship between the voluntary disclosure extent and both listing 
status and firm size. 
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Cooke 1989b 
38 unlisted Swedish firms 
33 firms listed on the Swedish market 
19 companies listed both on the Swedish 
market and on at least one foreign 
market 
146 
There is a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure extent and both listing 
status and firm size. Moreover, « commercial firms » publish less voluntary information 
than firms in other sectors. 
Cooke 1991 48 firms listed on Japanese market 106 There is a positive relationship between the voluntary disclosure level and firm size. 
Gray, Meek et 
Roberts 1995 
58 U.S. companies and 32 British firms 
listed on both their domestic market and 
external market 
58 U.S. companies and 32 British firms 
listed only on their domestic market 
128 The firms listed on both the domestic and external markets present publication levels higher than the firms listed only on their domestic market. 
Raffournier 1995 161 firms listed on the Swiss market 30 The level of disclosure is significantly correlated with firm size, degree of international 
openness, size of audit firms and to a lesser extent to the diffuse nature of ownership. 
Hossain, Perera 
and  Rahman 1995 
55 companies listed on the New Zealand 
market 95 
There is a positive relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure of firms studied 
and the size, debt level and external listing 
Owusu-Ansah 1998 49 listed companies in Zimbabwe 214 The level of disclosure is positively correlated with size, profitability, shareholder 
structure. 
Depoers 2000 102 listed companies in France 65 There is a positive relationship between the level of voluntary publication, size and 
external activities of firms. 
Archambault and 
Archambault 2003 621 listed companies across 33 countries 85 
Disclosure are influenced by three elements: culture (religion, education, individualism 
...), national systems (freedom, press, inflation, financial markets ...) and systems 
company (shareholders, debt, dividends, listeners , size ...). 
Eng, Mak and 
Forker 2003 158 companies listed in Singapore 84 
Impact of ownership structure and composition of the board of directors on disclosure 
strategy. 
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Table 3. Lists of voluntary items used in the literature 
 
 
 
Table 4. Sample of SBF 120 Index firms 
 
(*Clarins and Thomson are kept; they are present 5 years over 6; in 2008 theses companies 
did not publicize annual report)  
 
Authors Year Country Items number 
Chau and Gray 2002 Hong-Kong 116 
Myburgh 2001 South Africa 49 
Depoers 2000 France 65 
Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 1995 New-Zealand 95 
Raffournier 1995 Switzerland 30 
Cooke 1989 Sweden 146 
Chow, Wong- Boren 1987 Mexico 24 
SBF 120 firms 120 
Companies are not present in the index during the entire study period - 44 
Financial and insurance companies    - 4 
Lack of information (not available annual report)* - 5 
Final sample 67 
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Table 5 List of the 40 items and number of occurrence over the global sample 
(Each information disclosure is numbered 1 (hit) / no disclosure is 0; sample of 67 firms over 
6 years; theoretical maximum number of occurrence is 16000; two firms absent in year 2008) 
# List of 40 items Total nb of hits 28 items 
Score 
35 items 
Score 
29 items 
Score 
1 Description of principal products / services - 
Market share 
398 X X X 
2 Forecast of profit year n +1 (qualitative) 5 X X  
3 Forecast of profit year n+1 (quantitative) 4 X X  
4 Future cash at horizon 2 to 5 years 0 X X  
5 Description of the major factories, 
warehouses and properties 
154  X  
6 Biographical Profile of Directors and 
Officers (responsibilities, experience, 
courses) 
399   X 
7 Capital expenditures (past and futures), 
Investments 
291 X X X 
8 Directors' biography 261 X X X 
9 General objectives of the firm – Goals 391 X X X 
10 Description of marketing network for final 
goods and services 
253 X X X 
11 Main activity or affiliation of directors with 
other organizations 
397 X  X 
12 Information on the social responsibility of 
the firm 
379  X X 
13 Structure of ownership, investors’ types and 
names 
394 X X X 
14 Historical share price – Trend 383   X 
15 Cost of sales 224 X X X 
16 Advertising expenditures: information and 
amount 
77 X X  
17 Human Resources: Cost of training 
operations 
212  X X 
18 Information on depreciation 38 X X  
19 Value added statement 54 X X  
20 Return on capital employed 95 X X  
21 Return on shareholders' securities 122 X X  
22 Cash Ratio - Current Ratio 44 X X  
23 Other financial ratios 344  X X 
24 Economic factors influencing future activity 399  X X 
25 Political and social  factors influencing 
future activity 
365  X X 
26 Technological factors influencing future 
activity 
217 X X X 
27 Discussion on past industry tendencies 377 X X X 
28 Discussion on future industry tendencies 363 X X X 
29 Position and competitive environment 394 X X X 
30 Policy and financial objectives 369 X X X 
31 Description of activities and transactions 
linked with government and state entities  
14 X X  
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32 Firm history 334 X X X 
33 Description of the organizational structure 352  X X 
34 Market capitalization and financial 
operations 
259   X 
35 Information on fixed assets variations 394    
36 Information on secured and non-secured 
debts 
320  X X 
37 Information on R&D projects 299 X X X 
38 Development of new products / services 320 X X X 
39 Number of employees 400 X X X 
40 Special report on employees and social 
activities 
307 X X X 
 Grand Total 10402    
 
 
 
 
Table 6 PCA analysis of the different scope of individual items 
(PC1 is the first principal component resulting from the principal component analysis of the 
array of 67 firms and respectively 40, 28, 29 and 35 items; correlation is the R-squared 
between the value of the coordinates of each firm on the PC1 and its equally weighted global 
score; PC2 is the second principal component; items are sum of dummy variable of the 
presence /absence of the item in the 2003-2008 financial reports; items are between 0 and 6) 
 Score 40 
items 
Score 28 
items 
Score 29 
items 
Score 35 
Items 
     
Correlation with PC1 0.9091 0.8797 0.9786 0.8996 
Variance explained (%) 
    
PC1 89.4% 88.1% 92.0% 87.7% 
PC2 1.3% 1.8% 1.3% 1.6% 
 
 
 
Table 7 Cross correlation between alternative global scores  
(R-squared values between global scores; score 40 is the global score comprising the 40 items 
list; respectively for the 28, 29 and 25 items list) 
 
 Score 40 Score 28 Score 29 
Score 28 0.8129   
Score 29 0.8429 0.6610  
Score 35 0.9645 0.8720 0.7915 
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Table 8 – Voluntary disclosure scores – Summary statistics 
 (Number of items per score is 40, 28, 35 and 29; 67 firms; Coef. Variation: standard 
deviation divided by mean) 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
40 items score 
      
Mean 24,42 25,00 26,21 26,51 26,13 27,82 
Median 25,00 25,00 27,00 27,00 27,00 28,00 
Min 13,00 16,00 18,00 18,00 19,00 22,00 
Max 30,00 30,00 31,00 32,00 32,00 32,00 
Std dev 3,02 2,87 2,53 2,46 2,79 2,16 
Coef. variation 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,09 0,11 0,08 
 
      
28 items score 
      
Mean 16,96 17,39 18,21 18,45 18,46 19,38 
Median 18,00 18,00 19,00 18,00 19,00 20,00 
Min 9,00 9,00 11,00 13,00 13,00 14,00 
Max 21,00 22,00 23,00 23,00 23,00 23,00 
Std dev 2,48 2,61 2,42 2,11 2,35 1,88 
Coef. Variation 0,15 0,15 0,13 0,11 0,13 0,10 
 
      
35 items score 
      
Mean 21,09 21,66 22,63 22,85 22,70 23,97 
Median 22,00 22,00 23,00 23,00 23,00 24,00 
Min 11,00 13,00 15,00 16,00 16,00 19,00 
Max 26,00 26,00 27,00 28,00 28,00 27,00 
Std dev 2,79 2,67 2,40 2,23 2,40 1,83 
Coef. Variation 0,13 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,11 0,08 
 
      
29 items score 
      
Mean 21,03 21,40 22,36 22,66 22,12 23,69 
Median 21,00 22,00 23,00 23,00 23,00 24,00 
Min 11,00 14,00 16,00 16,00 16,00 19,00 
Max 25,00 25,00 25,00 26,00 26,00 27,00 
Std dev 2,72 2,34 2,05 1,88 2,20 1,79 
Coef. Variation 0,13 0,11 0,09 0,08 0,10 0,08 
 
Table 9  
Median scores over the 2003-2004 sub period and the 2006-2007 sub-period; High disclosing 
firms are those with an individual score above or equal to the median; low disclosing firms 
have below median scores; Number of firms belonging to each high/low group; prob. to 
remain in the group: percentage of firms belonging to the group in the first sub-period still in 
the group in the second sub-period) 
  2003-4 2006-7 Prob. to remains in the group 
Median score  50 53  
#Highly disclosing firms 34 39 76,47% 
#Low disclosing firms 33 28 60,61% 
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Table 10 – List of variables 
 
Variables  Definition Comment 
ABS_ACCUR_NORM Absolute forecast error Absolute value of the forecast error (see ACCUR) 
divided by the stock value ate the end of the fiscal 
year 
ACCUR Forecast accuracy Forecast errors between the actual EPS related to 
given fiscal year and the mean analyst forecast at 
the end of the fiscal year. (IBES) 
CAC Firm belonging to the 
top tier CAC 40 stock 
Index 
Dummy variable (1 if belongs to the French CAC 
40 index)  
FOR_STD Dispersion of earning 
forecasts  
Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of 
earning per share. (IBES) 
FOR_STD_NORM Forecast dispersion Standard deviation of forecast (see FOR_STD) 
divided by the stock price at the end of the fiscal 
year  
IFRS Introduction of IFRS 
standards 
Dummy variable (0 in 2003-2004; 1 in 2005-
2008) 
INST_OWN Institutional investors’ 
ownership 
Equity share of capital held by institutional 
investors (Thomson Financial) 
LNTA Size of the firm Log of the total assets (Thomson Financials) 
LT_DT_OV_CAP Leverage ratio Long term debt over book capital (Thomson 
Financial) 
MTB Market to Book ratio (Datastream) 
NB_ANAL Number of analysts 
following the firm 
Number of analysts providing earning per share 
forecasts. (IBES) 
OP_MARGIN Operating margin above Operating profit over total sales in 
percentage (Thomson Financial)  
RISK_MKT Market risk indicator Yearly beta coefficient using 52 weekly stock 
returns and regressed with the SBF 120 Stock 
Index. (Thomson Financial) 
SCORE Financial voluntary 
publication score 
Estimated by the number of items of voluntary 
disclosed information in the annual report ot the 
year t by the firm i. (Between 0 and 28) 
SCOREDUMYEAR Highly communicant 
firms dummy 
Dummy variables for highly communicant firms. 
Considering each year scores, firms with a 
publication score above or equal to the median 
value are flagged (1); Non communicant are 
below the median 
SCOREHIGHYEAR Highly communicant 
firm score values 
Difference of each year score value and its 
median only is positive, 0 otherwise for forms 
with scores at or below its yearly median value 
TOP_3 Share ownership 
concentration 
Sum of the equity stake of the three first 
shareholders (Thomson Financial) 
TREND Time trend 1 to 6 for each year of the 2003-2008 period 
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Table 11 Descriptive statistics 
(64 firms; period 2003-2008; source: see Table 10) 
 
Variables  N Mean Standard deviation  
Min Max 
ABS_ACCUR_NORM 377 0.0403 0.1483 0.000013 1.913543 
ACCUR 377 -0.8663 4.0596 -45.80509 4.89036 
CAC 384 0.3958 0.4897 0 1 
FOR_STD 377 0.3576 0.5882 0.010829 9.42272 
FOR_STD_NORM 377 0.0151 0.0664 0.000701 1.24721 
IFRS 384 0.6667 0.4720 0 1 
INST_OWN 379 16.9417 8.7206 0.13 63.51 
LT_DT_OV_CAP 382 34.504062 21.85892 0 150.87853 
LNTA 382 8.838708 1.469723 5.299322 11.67249 
MTB 379 2.441557 1.757669 -4.87 15.69 
NB_ANAL 378 16.611111 6.568923 1 36 
OP_MARGIN 382 9.858321 8.485468 -31.68977 45.368 
RISK_MKT 379 0.340657 0.174108 -0.05186 0.955 
SCORE 384 16.067708 2.37823 8 21.000 
SCOREDUMYEAR 384 0.578125 0.494503 0 1 
SCOREHIGHYEAR 384 0.625 1.047189 0 5 
TOP_3 379 37.435858 21.181419 2.56 87.09 
TREND 384 3.5 1.710053 1 6 
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Table 12 Existence of a time dimension effect in the score variable 
(Poisson regression; dependent variable is the voluntary disclosure score index SCORE; variables see table 9; INDUSTRY: set of 10 dummy variables 
corresponding to the ICB industry codes; sig: significant industry dummies; 64 firms; period 2003-2008; variable description: see Table 10; a,b,c: significant at 
the 1%, 5% 10%level) 
 
Variables Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Variables Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
LNTA 0.0141 0.06c 0.0128 0.09 ABS_ACCUR_NORM -0.0385 0.23 -0.0233 0.48 
NB_ANAL 0.0007 0.60 0.0003 0.82 LNTA 0.0171 0.04b 0.0148 0.07c 
INST_OWN 0.0014 0.14 0.0021 0.02b NB_ANAL 0.0007 0.62 0.0005 0.75 
RISK_MKT 0.0644 0.17 0.1260 0.00a INST_OWN 0.0013 0.17 0.0021 0.03b 
TOP_3 0.0002 0.62 0.0004 0.24 RISK_MKT 0.0414 0.40 0.1077 0.02b 
TREND 0.0223 0.00a   LT_DT_OV_CAP -0.0006 0.15 -0.0005 0.22 
IFRS   0.0791 0.00a TOP_3 0.0001 0.82 0.0004 0.30 
     MTB 0.0008 0.82 -0.0010 0.77 
     TREND 0.0225 0.00a   
     IFRS   0.0775 0.00a 
INDUSTRY yes sig yes sig INDUSTRY yes sig yes sig 
LR test 38.95  40.13  LR test 39.88  40.74  
p-val 0.00  0.00  p-val 0.00  0.00  
pseudo R2 0.29  0.30  pseudo R2 0.30  0.30  
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Table 13 Individual and time effects 
(analysis of variance of series, 64 firms and 6 years, N=384 observations; a,b,c: significant at the 1%, 5% 10%level) 
Voluntary score SCORE F p-value 
Individual firm’s effect 8.44 0.00a 
Time effect 10.64 0.00a 
Forecast accuracy (FOR_ACCUR_NORM)   
Individual firm’s effect 2.47 0.00a 
Time effect 2.63 0.02b 
Analysts’ forecast dispersion (FOR_STD_NORM)   
Individual firm effect 1.19 0.17 
Time effect 1.59 0.16 
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Table 14 Determinants of the disclosure score index 
(Panel analysis; dependent variable is SCORE or variation SCORE – SCORE{1}; {1} signals a one year lagged variable; Fixed effect: random or fixed individual effect; variables: see table 
9;Constant in the variable is the constant in the random individual effect; INDUSTRY: set of 10 dummy variables corresponding to the ICB industry codes; sig: significant industry dummies; 
Normality: Jarque-Bera test of normality of the residuals, the p-value of the Jarque-Bera statistic is displayed; 64 firms; period 2003-2008; variable description: see Table 10; a,b,c: significant 
at the 1% level, the 5% level, the 10% level) 
M1   M2   M3   M4   M5   
Dependent  SCORE  SCORE   SCORE   SCORE   var in SCORE   
Fixed effect  rand  rand   rand   rand   rand   
FOR_STD 0.6878  FOR_STD 0.9534  Constant 8.2045 a Constant 8.2300 a Constant 0.7731  
LNTA 0.1222  LNTA 0.0835  FOR_STD 0.6803  FOR_STD 0.9427  FOR_STD 0.5023  
LEVERAGE -0.0040  LEVERAGE -0.0047  LNTA 0.2121  LNTA 0.1817  FOR_STD{1} -1.6915  
TREND 0.2877 a IFRS 0.7627 a LEVERAGE -0.0024  LEVERAGE -0.0030  LNTA -0.0058  
SCORE{1} 0.3259 a SCORE{1} 0.3238 a TREND 0.2798 a IFRS 0.7335 a LEVERAGE -0.0023  
CAC 0.2807  CAC 0.3049  SCORE{1} 0.3460 a SCORE{1} 0.3455 a TREND 0.0581  
NB_ANAL -0.0034  NB_ANAL -0.0055  CAC 0.2849  CAC 0.3077  CAC -0.2878  
INST_OWN -0.0147  INST_OWN -0.0022  NB_ANAL -0.0014  NB_ANAL -0.0033  NB_ANAL -0.0084  
TO_3 -0.0073  TOP_3 -0.0022  INST_OWN -0.0166  INST_OWN -0.0044  INST_OWN -0.0115  
ACCUR -0.5416  ACCUR -0.3699  TOP_3 -0.0090  TOP_3 -0.0040  TOP_3 -0.0050  
RISK 0.6998  RISK 1.9956 a ACCUR -0.3993  ACCUR -0.2369  ACCUR -0.6695  
      RISK 0.7095  RISK 1.9604 a ACCUR{1} 1.2953 c 
            RISK 0.7749  
INDUSTRY yes sig INDUSTRY yes sig INDUSTRY no  INDUSTRY no  INDUSTRY no  
Normality 0.009a   0.014b   0.020b   0.030b   0.000a  
R2 0.74   0.74   0.74   0.74   0.03  
                              
M6   M7   M8   M9   M10   
var in SCORE  var in SCORE  SCORE   SCORE   SCORE   
rand   fixed   rand   rand   fixed   
LNTA -0.0655  LNTA 0.1984  SCORE{1} 0.3272 a Constant 9.7856 a ACCUR{1} 0.4299  
TREND 0.0570  LEVERAGE 0.0015  ACCUR{1} 0.5950  ACCUR{1} 0.8253  SCORE{1} 0.1432 b 
ACCUR{1} 1.2657 c IFRS 0.2821  FOR_STD{1} -4.7310  SCORE{1} 0.3435 a CAC 0.5126  
RISK 0.7362  CAC 0.3571  TREND 0.3383 a CAC 0.6359 c TREND 0.4448 a 
OMARG -0.0114  NB_ANAL -0.0356     TREND 0.3214 a INST_OWN -0.0226 c 
   INST_OWN -0.0151     INST_OWN -0.0174  TOP_3 -0.0199  
   TOP_3 0.0022     TOP_3 -0.0079  OMARG -0.0259  
   ACCUR{1} 1.6122 b    OMARG -0.0120  FOR_STD{1} -4.6626  
   RISK 1.2476     FOR_STD{1} -3.1051  RISK 0.3534  
         RISK 0.7838     
INDUSTRY yes non sig INDUSTRY no  INDUSTRY yes sig INDUSTRY no  INDUSTRY no  
Normality 0.000a   0.003a   0.001a   0.018b   0.004a  
R2 0.08   0.11   0.74   0.74   0.76  
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Table 15 Determinants of the forecasting accuracy and the forecast dispersion 
(Panel analysis; dependent variable is forecasting accuracy ACCUR or analysts’ forecast dispersion FOR_STD; {1} signals a one year lagged variable; Fixed effect: random or fixed individual 
effect; variables: see table 9;Constant in the variable is the constant in the random individual effect; INDUSTRY: set of 10 dummy variables corresponding to the ICB industry codes; sig: 
significant industry dummies; Normality: Jarque-Bera test of normality of the residuals, the p-value of the Jarque-Bera statistic is displayed; 64 firms; period 2003-2008; variable description: 
see Table 10; a,b,c: significant at the 1% level, the 5% level, the 10% level) 
M1   M2   M3   M4   M5   M6   
Dependent  ACCUR  ACCUR   ACCUR   ACCUR   ACCUR   ACCUR   
Fixed effect  rand  rand   rand   rand   rand   fixed   
Constant -0.1415  SCORE -0.0084 b Constant -0.0792  Constant -0.1200  Constant -0.0660  SCORE -0.0057  
SCOREDUM{1} 0.0158  LNTA 0.0230 a SCORE -0.0053  SCORE -0.0032  SCORE -0.0048  SCOREDUM{1} 0.0157  
FOR_STD 0.1951  NB_ANAL 0.0016  SCOREDUM{1} 0.0214  SCOREDUM{1} 0.0172  SCOREDUM{1} 0.0181  LNTA -0.0220  
LNTA 0.0335 b LEVERAGE -0.0004  LNTA 0.0333 b LNTA 0.0353 a LNTA 0.0317 b NB_ANAL -0.0002  
NB_ANAL 0.0005  CAC -0.1011 a NB_ANAL -0.0002  NB_ANAL 0.0005  NB_ANAL 0.0003  TREND -0.0076  
LEVERAGE 0.0002     IFRS -0.0483 a IFRS -0.0453 a TREND -0.0131 a CAC -0.2211 a 
CAC -0.1612 a    CAC -0.1734 a CAC -0.1653 a CAC -0.1690 a FOR_STD 0.1920 b 
IFRS -0.0422 a    FOR_STD 0.2018 a RISK -0.0753 c FOR_STD 0.2259 a    
RISK -0.0831 b       FOR_STD 0.2148 a       
OPMARG -0.0020 c                
                  
                  
M1   M2   M3            
Dependent  FOR_STD   FOR_STD   FOR_STD           
Fixed effect  random   random   fixed           
Constant 0.0167  Constant -0.0410  FOR_STD{1} 1.0435 a          
FOR_STD{1} 1.0230 a FOR_STD{1} 1.0600 a SCORE{1} 0.0084 b          
SCOREDUM{1} -0.0068  SCORE{1} 0.0062 c SCOREDUM{1} -0.0251 c          
LNTA -0.0014  SCOREDUM{1} -0.0225 c LNTA -0.0457 c          
NB_ANAL -0.0007  LNTA -0.0041  NB_ANAL -0.0006           
IFRS 0.0134  NB_ANAL -0.0009  IFRS 0.0133           
CAC 0.0104  IFRS 0.0068  CAC 0.0234           
   CAC 0.0116              
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Table 16 Endogeneity and systems of equations 
(Multivariate Panel analysis; panel of individual effects, time effect is analyzed with the TREND (upper part of the table) or IFRS 
(lower part of the table) variables; dependent variables are voluntary disclosure SCORE, forecasting accuracy ACCUR and 
analysts’ forecast dispersion FOR_STD; {1} signals a one year lagged variable; Fixed effect: random or fixed individual effect; 
variables: see table 9;Constant in the variable is the constant in the random individual effect; INDUSTRY: set of 10 dummy 
variables corresponding to the ICB industry codes; sig: significant industry dummies; Normality: Jarque-Bera test of normality of 
the residuals, the p-value of the Jarque-Bera statistic is displayed; 64 firms; period 2003-2008; variable description: see Table 10; 
a,b,c: significant at the 1% level, the 5% level, the 10% level) 
 System 1      System 2         
EQ 1   EQ2   EQ1   EQ2   EQ3   
Dependent SCORE  ACCUR   SCORE   ACCUR   FOR_STD   
Fixed effect random  random   random   random   random   
Constant 4.5517 a Constant 0.0015  Constant 4.5517 a Constant 0.0015  Constant -0.0582  
ACCUR{1} 1.2982 b SCORE 0.0019  ACCUR{1} 1.2982 b SCORE 0.0019  FOR_STD{1} 1.0056 a 
SCORE{1} 0.6917 a LNTA 0.0091  SCORE{1} 0.6917 a LNTA 0.0091  SCORE{1} 0.0043  
CAC 0.1445  NB_ANAL -0.0004  CAC 0.1445  NB_ANAL -0.0004  SCOREDUM{1} -0.0222 c 
TREND 0.1396 c TREND -0.0160 a TREND 0.1396 c TREND -0.0160 a LNTA 0.0019  
INST_OWN -0.0061  CAC -0.0346 c INST_OWN -0.0061  CAC -0.0346 c NB_ANAL -0.0009  
TO_3 -0.0017  FOR_STD 0.2533 a TO_3 -0.0017  FOR_STD 0.2533 a IFRS 0.0072  
OMARG -0.0035     OMARG -0.0035     CAC -0.0006  
FOR_STD{1} -3.2688     FOR_STD{1} -3.2688        
RISK 1.1700 c    RISK 1.1700        
Panel indiv  indiv   indiv   indiv   indiv   
Normality 0.010 b    0.010 b        
R2 0.62  0.07   0.62   0.07   0.09   
System 1      System 2         
EQ 1   EQ2   EQ1   EQ2   EQ3   
Dependent SCORE  ACCUR   SCORE   ACCUR   FOR_STD   
Fixed effect Random  random   random   random   random   
Constant 4.4733 a Constant 0.0015  Constant 4.4733 a Constant 0.0015  Constant -0.0582  
ACCUR{1} 1.3175 b SCORE 0.0019  ACCUR{1} 1.3175 b SCORE 0.0019  FOR_STD{1} 1.0056 a 
SCORE{1} 0.6862 a LNTA 0.0091  SCORE{1} 0.6862 a LNTA 0.0091  SCORE{1} 0.0043  
CAC 0.1333  NB_ANAL -0.0004  CAC 0.1333  NB_ANAL -0.0004  SCOREDUM{1} -0.0222 c 
IFRS 0.5267 b TREND -0.0160 a IFRS 0.5267 b TREND -0.0160 a LNTA 0.0019  
INST_OWN -0.0006  CAC -0.0346 c INST_OWN -0.0006  CAC -0.0346 c NB_ANAL -0.0009  
TO_3 0.0006  FOR_STD 0.2533 a TO_3 0.0006  FOR_STD 0.2533 a IFRS 0.0072  
OMARG -0.0069     OMARG -0.0069     CAC -0.0006  
FOR_STD{1} -2.1379     FOR_STD{1} -2.1379        
RISK 1.6027 a    RISK 1.6027 a       
Panel Indiv  indiv   indiv   indiv   indiv   
Normality 0.018 b    0.018 b        
R2 0.62  0.07   0.62   0.07   0.09   
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Figure 1. Average voluntary disclosure score over the 2003-2008 period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
